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Abstract
Using daily price quotes from about 8,000 French gas stations, this paper em-
pirically analyses whether the level of competition determines the degree of price
stickiness on the retail gasoline market. The degree of price rigidity is measured
by the frequency of price changes, while the distance to the nearest station and
the number of gas stations within a given radius are considered as proxies for local
competition. The results confirm that local competition is an important determi-
nant of the price-setting behavior of gas stations. Indeed, considering Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) and spatial regression models, we find that the degree of price
rigidity is positively related to the distance to the nearest station, and negatively
related to the concentration of firms in a given geographical area. This result
can be notably explained by the fact that gas stations facing a high competitive
pressure are more likely to adjust their prices more quickly and more frequently
in response to crude oil price decreases than stations enjoying market power.
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1 Introduction
An important factor determining firms’ pricing behavior is the market structure. An
extensive academic literature in industrial economics has investigated this issue. In
particular, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the question of whether price
inertia depends on the degree of market competition. It is often argued that firms
operating in competitive markets are more likely to adjust more quickly and more
frequently their prices in response to cost and demand shocks than firms enjoying
market power. Indeed, the opportunity cost of not adjusting prices to optimal ones
is very high for firms in competitive markets (Ginsburgh and Michel, 1988; Martin,
1993). Moreover, as stressed by Encaoua and Geroski (1986), firms in more competitive
industries face higher uncertainty about their future position in the market. Conse-
quently, they may be more concerned with ensuring short-run returns, which leads to
a higher responsiveness to current shocks. By contrast, pricing policies of firms facing
less competition are more oriented by long-run objectives than by short-run costs or
demand fluctuations, resulting in a higher price rigidity. Alternatively, Stiglitz (1984)
argues that oligopolists may prefer delays in adjusting prices in order to avoid breaking
tacit pricing understandings.
A number of empirical studies have investigated the link between competition and
price flexibility across different industries. Among the pioneer papers on this issue, we
find for instance Dixon (1983), Carlton (1986), Bedrossian and Moschos (1988) and
Weiss (1995) on the manufacturing sectors, while Hannan and Berger (1991) focus on
the banking industry. Overall, these studies tend to support the existence of a greater
price rigidity in markets characterized by higher levels of concentration, viewed as an
inverse proxy for market competition. Furthermore, Hannan and Berger (1991) show
that the degree of price rigidity is asymmetric. Deposit rates are significantly more
rigid when the stimulus for a change is upward rather than downward. More recently,
the existence of a negative relationship between competition and price rigidity has
been documented on the basis of surveys on pricing-setting behavior of firms (see, e.g.,
Alvarez and Hernando, 2006; Cornille and Dossche, 2006; Fabiani et al., 2006). For
instance, these studies use a measure of perceived competition as a proxy for market
competition, measured as the importance a firm attaches to competitors’ prices when
considering reducing its own prices. Results obtained by these studies corroborate
previous findings. The frequency of price adjustment and the speed of adjustment is
positively related to the degree of competition.
Within this line of research, the present paper revisits the relationship between the
intensity of market competition and the degree of price stickiness by focusing on the
French retail gasoline market. Several points have motivated this research. First, due
to expansion of vehicle fleet and increasing consumption of fuel, retail gasoline prices
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and the pricing strategies that fuel retailers adopt directly impact consumer welfare.
The price-setting behavior of gas stations is the object of an active public debate,
one that typically centers around the suspicion of a non-competitive pricing behavior.
Second, contrary to the studies cited above, we have information on the geographical
location of firms. Then, we are able to assess the degree of local competition between
firms, which is certainly a more appropriate measure of market competition than the
concentration within an industry or the perceived competition. Third, the character-
istics of the retail gasoline market imply that it is particularly suitable for comparing
the rigidity of prices between firms and investigating the role played by competition.
Indeed, retail gasoline is a fairly homogeneous product, and all firms in the market
face the same cost shocks, induced by the changes in the wholesale price. Moreover,
contrary to other industries, the menu costs, also known as the “cost for updating
prices”, are relatively low. Consequently, they are not a source of price rigidity, and
do not explain why some gas stations show a relatively low price flexibility. Finally, to
the best of our knowledge, it is one of the first empirical studies with the recent papers
of Gautier and Le Saout (2015, 2017) that formally investigates whether the degree of
spatial competition is a driver of price stickiness on the retail gasoline market1.
To this end, we use individual gasoline prices collected at a daily frequency for
more than 8,000 French gas stations. Following the existing literature, we consider
the frequency of price changes as a inverse measure of price stickiness. Concerning
the degree of local competition, it is proxied by the distance in kilometers (km) to
the nearest station and the number of gas stations within a 3km, 5km and 10 km
radius. As expected, after having controlled for some other potential determinants of
price stickiness, our results suggest that the intensity of local competition reduces the
rigidity of retail gasoline prices. They also indicate that the degree of price stickiness of
gas stations strongly depends on the price-setting behavior of their local competitors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of previous
empirical studies having investigated the relationship between competition and retail
gasoline prices. Section 3 describes the data used and the measures of price stickiness
and competition considered. Section 4 presents our empirical analysis and discusses
the results. Section 5 concludes.
1Note, however, that the empirical investigation conducted by Gautier and Le Saout (2015) is
somewhat different from our analysis in this article. The authors analyse whether the degree of pass-
through from the wholesale price to retail prices depends on the degree of local competition, but do not
investigate the link between competition and the frequency of price changes. Moreover, the measure
of local competition they consider just relies to the competition between traditional gas stations and
stations associated to supermarkets. They find that gas stations respond more slowly to changes in
their costs if the competition pressure from supermarket gas stations is relatively low.
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2 Competition and retail gasoline prices: A literature overview
In response to antitrust and regulatory concerns, the empirical literature on gasoline
retailing has been growing rapidly over the last three decades. Much of this literature
focuses on retail gasoline price dynamics and is concerned with understanding how
and why prices change over time. As argued by Gautier and Le Saout (2015), gaso-
line prices appear as a textbook to investigate price dynamics, since price changes in
gas stations are known to be infrequent whereas wholesale gasoline prices, and then
marginal costs, change every day. In particular, since the seminal study of Borenstein
et al. (1997), there has been an explosion of empirical work examining whether retail
prices respond asymmetrically to positive and negative shocks to crude oil prices and
wholesale gasoline prices2. However, empirical findings are mixed and often depend on
the market considered, on the frequency and the level of aggregation of data used (see,
e.g., Bachmeier and Griffin, 2003; Geweke, 2004 for a discussion), and on the econo-
metric approach (Douglas, 2010). Moreover, as documented by the meta-analysis of
Perdiguero-Garcia (2013), results also exhibit some degree of publication bias.
Given these conflicting results, the literature extends the analysis by investigating
the factors that may explain why retail gasoline prices respond faster to wholesale price
increases than to equivalent wholesale price decreases. Among the potential sources of
pass-through asymmetry, the consumer search behavior and the focal price collusion
theories are certainly those that have received the most attention in the literature.
The former, developed by Yang and Ye (2008), Tappata (2009), Lewis (2011) and
Cabral and Fishman (2012), is based on the idea that the willingness of consumers to
engage in costly search, and hence the elasticity of demand faced by firms, is influenced
by the magnitude and the direction of price changes. In particular, it is assumed
that consumers are more likely to search intensely following a cost increase than a
decrease. Such a purchasing behavior of retail gas consumers is confirmed by Hastings
and Shapiro (2013), who show that consumers are more price sensitive when prices
increase. Consequently, knowing this purchasing behavior, gas stations will have lower
incentive to decrease price following a cost decrease than to increase price following
a cost increase, which leads to asymmetric price adjustments. The recent papers by
Remer (2015) and Lewis (2011) on the US retail gasoline market find evidence in favor
of the consumer search-based theory.
Based on the “trigger price” model of Green and Porter (1984), Borenstein et al.
(1997) hypothesize that a focal price collusion can also explain the asymmetric pricing
2Note that Bacon (1991) first demonstrated for the UK market that retail gasoline firms respond
with greater speed to wholesale price increases than decreases. He was the first one to use the term
“rockets and feathers” to describe this asymmetric pricing phenomenon, gasoline prices shooting up
like rockets but falling like feathers. This expression is now frequently used in the literature on gasoline
retailing. Asymmetric pricing, however, is not confined to the retail gasoline industry. Peltzman (2000)
provides evidence that such a pattern is common across other industries as well.
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behavior of stations. The focal price collusion theory suggests that when wholesale
prices fall, previous retail prices may act as focal points around which gasoline retail-
ers can collude. Consequently, stations are more likely to maintain their past prices
when wholesale gasoline prices decrease. On the other hand, stations would immedi-
ately raise retail prices in response to wholesale price increases, because continuing to
charge past prices would be unprofitable. Asymmetric adjustment results because col-
lusion delays price reductions but not price increases. Empirically, a number of studies
on different jurisdictions find evidence consistent with the collusion explanation for
asymmetric pricing in the retail gasoline industry. The recent empirical evidence pro-
vided by Lewis (2015) on the U.S. gasoline retail market also suggests that the use of
odd prices can be an effective mechanism for tacitly coordinating prices. Indeed, he
finds that stations that rely more heavily on odd prices, particularly those ending in 5
or 9, tend to have higher margins.
Considering that tacit collusion is generally easier and more sustainable in con-
centrated markets, several authors have investigated whether the structure of gasoline
retail markets and the degree of market power of firms can explain asymmetric adjust-
ments of retail prices. The first empirical paper on this issue is from Deltas (2008).
Using monthly state level US data, Deltas (2008) shows that markets with higher
average retail-wholesale margins, and then a higher degree of retail market power,
experience a slower adjustment and a more asymmetric response. In other words,
asymmetric adjustments are more prevalent in less competitive gasoline retail mar-
kets. Results obtained by Verlinda (2008) and Balmaceda and Soruco (2008), using
station level data in Southern California and Chile, respectively, confirm that stations
with greater market power exhibit greater price-response asymmetry. In particular,
Verlinda (2008) shows that the asymmetric pricing behavior decreases with the geo-
graphical proximity of fuel retailers, confirming that the degree of competitiveness is a
key driver of retail price asymmetries. Furthermore, Balmaceda and Soruco (2008) find
that the degree of pass-through asymmetry is different for branded gas stations and
unbranded stations, the branded stations having a more asymmetric price-adjustment
pattern than unbranded stations, as may be expected under a collusive explanation.
Based on the Edgeworth cycle model proposed by Edgeworth (1925) and formalized
in Maskin and Tirole (1988), Eckert (2003) and Noel (2007a, 2007b) show for the
Canadian gasoline market that competitive local markets tend to have short-lived
price cycles (or not cycle at all), while isolated and less competitive markets often
exhibit long periods of price stability and month-long cycles. Edgeworth cycles are then
another way to explain the inverse relationship between competition and asymmetric
gasoline pricing3.
3See Eckert (2013) for a complete literature review on Edgeworth cycles in gasoline pricing, while
an overview of methods of identifying Edgeworth cycles can be found in Zimmerman el al. (2013).
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In parallel to this literature on fuel retail price trajectories, we find a large empiri-
cal literature that investigated the determinants of price levels and their dispersion. In
particular, this literature has examined whether fuel retail prices are associated with
market power and spatial competition. Using data at the level of the city or state, the
first studies on this issue typically estimate reduced form price equations to analyse
how market structure and concentration may affect competitive pricing behavior, and
then price levels. Using average monthly retail prices across eleven Canadian cities
over the 1991-1997 period, Sen (2003) finds that the local retail market concentration,
measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, is positively and significantly associated
with gasoline retail prices. However, results are not statistically significant when the
market concentration is proxied by the density of stations. In another study on the
same gasoline market, Sen (2005) shows that this positive relationship between con-
centration and average retail prices is particularly evident when the market share of
small and independent gasoline retailers is relatively high. Sen (2005) explains this re-
sult by the fact that an increase in market concentration among smaller firms reduces
the market concentration among vertically integrated firms, and then results in lower
average retail prices. Similar results are obtained by Hastings (2004) using data from
the San Diego and Los Angeles Metropolitan areas.
Clemenz and Gugler (2006) re-examined the results of Sen (2003) in the case of
Austria, using the 121 political districts of Austria as regional units. However, they do
not consider the average gasoline retail price as dependent variable, but the average
retail margin. A negative relationship is expected between the density of gasoline sta-
tions, proxied by the number of stations within a district, and the margin. Moreover,
Clemenz and Gugler (2006) take into account the fact that the locational choice of
stations, and then the stations density, is not exogenous to the district characteristics,
notably the level of demand for gasoline, which can impact the prices set by retail-
ers. Despite these methodological differences, results obtained by Clemenz and Gugler
(2006) support those of Sen (2003). Indeed, they find a negative and significant rela-
tionship between the density of gasoline stations and the average retail margin, and
their results are robust when they change the level of aggregation by considering Aus-
trian cities. More recently, Angelopoulou and Gibson (2010) obtained similar results
in the case of Greece. Using aggregate data at the prefecture level, they find that the
number of gasoline retailers in a given region, viewed as a proxy for competition, has
a negative and significant impact on the average retail prices. However, as suggested
by Van Meerbeeck (2003) on the Belgian retail gasoline market, the size of this effect
is relatively small.
With the increasing availability of high-frequency station level price data, much
attention has been paid to the determinants of cross-sectional price dispersion, and
especially the role played by the competition. In contrast to previous studies, this
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literature does not consider the market concentration at the level of the city or state
as a proxy for competition, but generally uses latitude and longitude information at
the station level to capture the degree of spatial competition between fuel retailers.
Among the proxies for spatial competition commonly used in the literature, we find in
particular the distance to the nearest competitor and the number of stations within a
certain radius (see, e.g., Haucap et al., 2017; Kihm et al., 2014; Hosken et al., 2008;
Eckert and West, 2005; Barron et al., 2004). For example, Hosken et al. (2008) and
Barron et al. (2004) consider the number of stations within a 1.5 mile radius, while
Haucap et al. (2017) and Eckert and West (2005) employ a 2km radius. Pennerstorfer
and Weiss (2013) also propose an alternative measure of “spatial clustering”, based on
the model of Salop (1979).
In general, whatever the market and the fuel type considered, the findings suggest
a significant relationship between the degree of spatial competition and the level of fuel
retail prices, even if in some cases results appear relatively sensitive to the composition
of the sample of stations (see, e.g., Hosken et al., 2008). Results show that individual
station prices are positively associated with the distance to the nearest competitor,
and negatively with the station density within a given radius. Thus, in line with
expectations, an increased spatial competition has a direct impact in lowering the price.
Furthermore, as suggested by Haucap et al. (2015) on the German market, it seems
that the degree of competition also drives the volatility of retail prices, approximated
in their case by the number of price changes per day. Haucap et al. (2017) find that
the distance to the nearest competitor significantly decreases price volatility, while the
inverse relationship is found when they consider the number of competitors in a 2km
radius as a proxy for spatial competition.
Finally, a small number of papers have also examined whether the relationship
between competition and fuel retail prices can play through the degree of information
of consumers. Indeed, as suggested by the “clearinghouse model” introduced by Varian
(1980) and further developed by Stahl (1989), the degree of information can impact
the pricing strategy of firms, and then the dispersion and the level of prices on a given
market. At the very extremes, this model predicts prices uniformity. If no consumer
has access to the information concerning all the prices charged in a given market, all
firms will charge the monopoly price. Conversely, if all consumers are fully informed,
this corresponds to the Bertrand situation, and all firms will charge a price equal to
the marginal cost. Consequently, one can expect that the degree of information of
consumers has a negative impact on price levels.
Pennerstorfer et al. (2014) have recently investigated this issue on the Austrian
retail gasoline market by using the commuter flows as a proxy for the degree of in-
formation. Indeed, as they argue, commuters can freely sample gasoline prices along
their daily commuting path and then, have access to the “clearinghouse”. Moreover,
7
as suggested by Marvel (1976), the important role of commuters on firms’ pricing de-
cisions can also be explained by the fact they tend to purchase more fuel than their
non-commuting counterparts, and therefore gain more information regarding the price
distribution on the market. After having controlled for the degree of spatial competi-
tion, results that Pennerstorfer et al. (2014) obtain show that the share of informed
consumers faced by a gas station has a negative and significant impact on price levels.
More precisely, going from a situation of no informed consumers to a situation where
all consumers are fully informed would reduce prices by about 2 cents. This result
reinforces previous findings from Houde (2012), who shows for the Que´bec City gaso-
line market that gas stations facing a high share of home-to-work commuters enjoy
relatively little market power, especially compared to a situation in which consumers
are located at a single point.
3 Data
Our dataset consists of individual gasoline prices reported by all French gas stations
selling more than 500 m3 of gasoline per year. The data were manually collected
at a daily frequency from a governmental website (www.prix-carburants.gouv.fr) for
the period from May 2nd, 2012 to April 30th, 2013. Indeed, since January 2007, gas
stations have to report all their price changes to the Ministry of Economy. Retail
prices are available for several types of gasoline (diesel, SP95, E10, SP95-E10, E85,
and LPG). In this paper, we focus on diesel prices, since it is the product for which we
have the larger number of observations. Moreover, in contrast to the North America,
diesel-engined vehicles represent a relatively large share of the vehicle fleet in France,
accounting for more than 50% of the total car stock in 2009 (Harding, 2014). All
retail prices are nominal end-customer prices in Euro per liter with three decimals
and includes all taxes and duties (i.e. the value-added tax and the domestic tax on
petroleum products). These taxes represent about 65% of the diesel price per liter.
All in all, after correcting for some measurement errors, our sample consists of about
2.8 millions of daily price quotes from 8,064 gas stations.
Using price quotes for each station on the overall period, we have computed the
frequency of price changes (STICKY), which measures the degree of price stickiness.
The frequency of price changes is defined as the number of price changes during the
overall period divided by the number of opening days, and is expressed in percentage.
Since gas stations report one price per day to the Ministry of Economy, this index
is comprised between 0 and 100. A value of zero corresponds to a situation where a
gas station never changes its prices during the period considered, while a value of 100
corresponds to a situation where a gas station changes its prices each day. Then, the
frequency of price changes is an inverse proxy for price stickiness. This variable has
8
been extensively used in the literature on consumer prices stickiness (see, e.g., Baudry
et al., 2007; Bils and Klenow, 2004). Moreover, this cross-sectional measure of price
rigidity is particularly suitable for our study since all firms on the gasoline retail market
face the same cost shocks. Based on the results from Eckert (2003) and Noel (2007a,
2007b), we expect a positive relationship between the degree of local competition and
the frequency of price changes.
The spatial distribution of gas stations and the degree of local competition faced by
firms are computed using the geo-coordinates of each station provided by the dataset.
Following the existing literature, we consider four alternative variables for proxying
the degree of competition: the distance in km to the nearest gas station (COMP1),
the number of stations within a 3 km (COMP2), a 5 km (COMP3), and a 10 km radius
(COMP4).
Beyond these alternative proxies for local competition, we also control for other
characteristics of gas stations that could explain their price-setting behavior. In par-
ticular, one would expect that the type of retailer is an important determinant of the
degree of price stickiness. The French market of gasoline consists of four types of re-
tailers: (i) stations belonging to major oil companies like Total, Esso, BP, Shell,...; (ii)
stations associated to supermarkets, which are located very close or in supermarkets;
(iii) small independent retailers; (iv) stations located on motorways4. Based on this
classification, we construct two dummy variables. The first takes the value of one if
a gas station is associated to a supermarket chain, and zero otherwise. The second
takes the value of one if a gas station is an independent retailer, and zero otherwise.
Consequently, as our sample does not include stations on highways, this means that
gas stations belonging to major oil companies are considered as the reference.
In the same vein, we control for the number of services offered in a gas station.
Indeed, the database details the type of services offered by each gas station. Twenty-
four different services are distinguished, such as as the presence of stores, restaurants,
car washes, and ATMs. The variable that we consider is the total number of services
offered in a gas station. We also capture the differences in terms of pricing policy by
controlling for the price level. For each gas station, it corresponds to the average daily
price over the considered period. Intuitively, a high price level means that a gas station
has certainly less responded, or more slowly, to wholesale price decreases. Then, we
expect a positive relationship between the price level and the degree of price rigidity.
The degree of price stickiness can also depend on the characteristics of the local
4Please note that we do not consider in our sample gas stations located on highways. Indeed,
the demand addressed to stations on highways is specific, in the sense that drivers rarely leave the
motorway to buy gasoline in urban areas, implying that competition on highways is mainly between
firms operating in this sector. Moreover, since these stations often belong to major oil companies and
face different demand profiles, one would expect a different pricing policy than stations operating in
urban areas.
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market, and especially on the demand addressed to each individual gas station. Since
we have no information on the volume of sales and the traffic intensity, we merge our
dataset with municipal and departmental data obtained from the French National In-
stitute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). Following the existing literature,
we consider several variables for approximating the local demand, and then the po-
tential demand addressed to each individual gas station. Thus, we first control for
the city size where the gas station is located. To this end, similar to Gautier and Le
Saout (2015, 2017), we consider three binary variables. The first is equal to one if
the gas station is located in a medium-size city, corresponding to an urban area with
20,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, and zero otherwise. The second is equal to one if the
gas station is located in a major urban centre with more than 100,000 inhabitants, and
zero otherwise. The last is equal to one if the gas station is located in Paris and its
region, and zero otherwise.
Furthermore, we consider a dummy variable equal to one if the gas station is located
in a rural area, and zero otherwise. Indeed, due a relatively low level of demand, gas
stations located in a rural area often practice a different pricing policy than stations
located in urban areas. In particular, the low volume of sales in rural areas implies that
a large number of rural gas stations change their sales prices only when they receive a
new delivery of fuel, in order to preserve their margins. Consequently, a higher price
rigidity is expected for rural gas stations.
Finally, the second set of control variables aims at capturing the socio-economic
conditions and the local population characteristics, and then the demand profile of the
market. In line with recent empirical papers on retail gasoline prices, four different
variables are considered: the logarithm of the annual median household income (Eckert
and West, 2005; Chouinard and Perloff, 2007), the unemployment rate (Sen, 2003;
Gautier and Le Saout, 2015, 2017), the number of campings (Pennerstorfer and Weiss,
2013), and the share of households owning a car (Chouinard and Perloff, 2007; Gautier
and Le Saout, 2017)5. The first three variables are available at the city-level and come
from the census 2012, while the share of households owning a car is only available at
the departmental level.
4 Empirical analysis
Based on the insights from the existing literature and on the arguments developed
above, our empirical analysis aims at testing whether the frequency of price changes
is negatively related to the distance to the nearest gas station, and positively related
5More precisely, Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013) consider the number of overnight stays of tourist
per month divided by the number of inhabitants of the municipality as measure of tourism intensity.
However, we do not have access to such data
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to the concentration of gas stations in a given radius. Nonetheless, before turning
to the econometric analysis, this section presents some preliminary findings on the
relationship between the level of local competition and the degree of price rigidity.
4.1 Preliminary findings
Table 1 reports the coefficients of correlation between our measure of price stickiness
and the four proxies for local competition. As expected, we find a negative and sig-
nificant correlation between the distance to the nearest gas station (COMP1) and the
frequency of price changes (STICKY). Thus, geographical proximity of stations seems
to decrease the rigidity of gasoline prices. Concerning the variables of spatial compe-
tition based on the number of gas stations within a given radius, we also obtain the
expected results. The correlation between these three variables (COMP2, COMP3,
COMP4) and the frequency of price changes is positive and statistically significant.
In Table 2 , we test whether the degree of price rigidity differs according to the
intensity of local competition. To this end, we conduct mean comparison tests by
considering for each competition measure the two extremes of the distribution, namely
the 25th and the 75th percentiles. Concerning the distance in km to the nearest
station, the 25th percentile contains gas stations facing high competition, and the
75th percentile firms that experience the lower competitive pressure. Conversely, if we
consider the competition measures based on the concentration of competitors within a
given radius, the 25th percentile refers to the lower degree of local competition and the
75th percentile to the greater degree of competition. Results show that, on average,
gas stations facing the greater competitive pressure exhibit a higher frequency of price
changes.
Finally, Figure 1 plots the fitted regression lines obtained by regressing our measure
of price stickiness on the different competition proxies. Results that we obtain confirm
previous findings. Indeed, we find a negative relationship between the distance to the
nearest station and the frequency of price changes, while this link is positive when
we consider competition proxies based on the number of gas stations within a given
radius.
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Table 1: Correlation matrix
STICKY COMP1 COMP2 COMP3 COMP4
STICKY 1.0000
COMP1 -0.1836* 1.0000
COMP2 0.1901* -0.3932* 1.0000
COMP3 0.1988* -0.3242* 0.9188* 1.0000
COMP4 0.1673* -0.2393* 0.7911* 0.9214* 1.0000
Note: Correlation coefficients are calculated on the total sample of gas stations (8,064 observa-
tions). COMP1 refers the distance in km to the nearest gas station, COMP2, COMP3 and COMP4
refer to the number of stations within a 2 km, a 5 km, and a 10 km radius, respectively. STICKY
corresponds to the frequency of price changes. The asterisk denotes that the correlation is significant
at the 10% level.
Table 2: Mean comparison tests
25th Percentile 75th Percentile
Distance in km to the nearest gas station
Frequency of price changes 21.855* 17.497*
Number of stations within a 3 km radius
Frequency of price changes 17.846* 25.471*
Number of stations within a 5 km radius
Frequency of price changes 16.538* 25.881*
Number of stations within a 10 km radius
Frequency of price changes 17.789* 25.701*
Note: Mean comparison tests are conducted on the total sample of gas stations (8,064 obser-
vations). They aim at comparing the degree of price stickiness according to the intensity of local
competition. For each competition measure, the two extremes of the distribution are considered, i.e.
the 25th and the 75th percentiles. The asterisk denotes a statistically significant difference at the 10%
level.
4.2 OLS estimates
To gauge the relationship between the level of local competition and the degree of
rigidity of diesel retail prices, we estimate the following cross-sectional equation:
Sticky = γ Comp+ β X + ε (1)
where Sticky is a n × 1 vector of observations on the dependent variable represent-
12
Figure 1: Local competition and frequency of price changes – Fitted regression lines
Note: Fitted regression lines obtained on the total sample of gas stations (8,064 observations) by
regressing the frequency of price changes on the four proxies for local competition. A 95% confidence
interval is considered.
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ing our measure of price stickiness, i.e. the frequency of price changes, Comp is a
n× 1 vector of observations on one of our four proxies for local competition (COMP1,
COMP2, COMP3, COMP4), and X ≡ {supermarket, independent retailer, number of
services, price level, rural area, medium urban area, big urban area, Paris area, me-
dian household income, unemployment rate, number of campings, share of households
owning one car, constant} is a n × k + 1 matrix of observations of on a set of k + 1
explanatory variables 6. εi is the random error term, a n× 1 vector. We also include
dummy variables for departments to capture potential unobserved heterogeneity be-
tween departments. Throughout the study, we will be primarily interested in the sign
and significance of the estimated coefficient γˆ. Equation (1) is estimated using the
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator.
Table 3 reports the results obtained by the estimation of equation (1). Specifica-
tion [1] presents the coefficient estimates with the distance in km to the nearest station
as proxy for local competition (COMP1), while specifications [2], [3] and [4] present
the coefficient estimates when we consider the number of gas stations within a 3km
(COMP2), 5km (COMP3) and 10 km (COMP4) radius as proxies for competition.
Consistent with the preliminary descriptive statistics, we can observe a negative and
significant relationship between the distance to the nearest gas station and the fre-
quency of price changes. Conversely, this relationship appears positive and significant
when we consider the number of stations within a given radius as proxy for local com-
petition. This confirms the fact that gas stations are more likely to change their prices
more frequently if they face a high competitive pressure.
Concerning control variables, results are overall those expected. Then, for all spec-
ifications, we find that supermarket chains and independent retailers are characterized
by a lower price flexibility than other gas stations, i.e. stations belonging to major oil
companies. The coefficient associated with these two dummy variables are negative
and statistically significant at the 1% level. An opposite sign is obtained concerning
the number of services offered in gas stations. Indeed, for specifications [1] to [4], our
results indicate that the number of services has a positive significant effect on the fre-
quency of price changes. Furthermore, as expected, we find a negative and significant
relationship between the price level and the frequency of price changes.
The city size seems also to explain the degree of price rigidity. Indeed, for all spec-
ifications, results show a positive and significant relationship between the urban area
dummies and the frequency of price changes. Conversely, we can observe a negative
and significant relationship between the rural area dummy and the frequency of price
changes. Such results suggest therefore that the intensity of the demand addressed to
gas stations, and then their volume of sales, is an important driver of the price-setting
behavior of fuel retailers. As Gautier and Le Saout (2015, 2017), results concerning the
6see Table A2 in Appendix for a detailed description of these variables.
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binary variable capturing the fact that a gas station is located in Paris and its region
are more mixed. Only specification [1] shows a positive and significant relationship
between this dummy variable and the frequency of diesel price changes.
Concerning the control variables proxying the local population characteristics and
the demand profile, we find more stable results. Thus, for all specifications, we find
that the frequency of price changes is positively and significantly related to the median
household income, the unemployment rate and the share of households owning a car.
Nonetheless, in line with Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2013), who argue that a large
number of tourists could indicate a larger share of uninformed consumers, we do not
find that the importance of tourism in a municipality, proxied in our case by the
number of campings, significantly impact the pricing policy of gas stations and their
degree of price flexibility.
We check the robustness of our empirical findings by considering alternative sets
of control variables. First, following Chouinard and Perloff (2007) and Pennerstorfer
and Weiss (2013), we replace dummies capturing the city size and the fact that a gas
station is located in Paris and its region by the logarithm of the population density.
Second, we replace the annual median household income by the average net hourly
wage of the municipality where each gas station is located. Finally, we replace the
number of campings in each municipality by the number of holiday villages as a proxy
for tourism intensity.
Results that we obtain are very similar to those reported in Table 37. Thus, they
confirm the fact the city size is an important determinant of the degree price stickiness
on the fuel retail market. Consistent with our previous findings, we find a positive
and significant relationship between the population density and the frequency of price
changes. Concerning the average net hourly wage, coefficient estimates exhibit the
same sign and level of significance than for the annual median household income. Sim-
ilarly to results reported above, we do not find a significant relationship between the
tourism intensity and our measure of price stickiness. More importantly, coefficients
estimates associated with our proxies for local competition remain statistically signif-
icant and with the expected sign. This confirms therefore that gas stations facing a
high competitive pressure are more likely to adjust their prices more quickly and more
frequently in response to crude oil price decreases than stations enjoying market power.
7Results of robustness checks are available upon request.
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Table 3: Local competition and the frequency of price changes: OLS estimates
[1] [2] [3] [4]
STICKY STICKY STICKY STICKY
COMP1 -0.192***
(0.048)
COMP2 0.306***
(0.053)
COMP3 0.182***
(0.026)
COMP4 0.061***
(0.010)
Supermarket -4.404*** -4.244*** -4.255*** -4.387***
(0.455) (0.452) (0.457) (0.457)
Independent retailer -6.344*** -6.308*** -6.276*** -6.297***
(0.532) (0.534) (0.532) (0.532)
Number of services 0.531*** 0.534*** 0.533*** 0.534***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Price level -163.250*** -162.985*** -163.113*** -163.636***
(5.195) (5.164) (5.151) (5.168)
Rural area -1.725*** -2.073*** -2.191*** -2.280***
(0.381) (0.334) (0.331) (0.332)
Medium urban area 2.727*** 2.137*** 2.080*** 2.534***
(0.317) (0.345) (0.338) (0.321)
Major urban area 3.406*** 2.420*** 1.767*** 2.148***
(0.363) (0.404) (0.433) (0.418)
Paris and its region 2.189** 0.859 -0.129 -0.746
(0.997) (1.032) (1.085) (1.153)
Median household income (log) 3.681*** 3.876*** 3.376** 3.080**
(1.382) (1.371) (1.369) (1.371)
Unemployment rate (%) 0.154*** 0.113*** 0.117*** 0.151***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Number of campings -0.036 -0.030 -0.017 -0.017
(0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Households owning a car (%) 1.699*** 1.661*** 1.563*** 1.480***
(0.246) (0.246) (0.249) (0.251)
Number of observations 8.064 8.064 8.064 8.064
R-squared 0.414 0.417 0.419 0.416
Note: This table shows the regression results with the frequency of price changes as dependent
variable. COMP1 refers the distance in km to the nearest gas station, COMP2, COMP3 and COMP4
refer to the number of stations within a 2 km, a 5 km, and a 10 km radius, respectively. Robust
standard errors are reported below their coefficient estimates. Constant and dummy variables for
departments are included but are not reported.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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4.3 Spatial estimates
The main feature of geographical data is that they could exhibit spatial autocorrela-
tion (LeSage and Pace, 2009). In other words, beyond the geographical proximity of
gas stations, we can imagine that the pricing policy of stations, and then their degree
of price stickiness, strongly depends on the price-setting behavior of their local com-
petitors (see, e.g., Atkinson et al., 2009). In particular, one can expect a higher price
flexibility for a gas station whose nearby competitors change their prices more fre-
quently than for a gas station whose nearby competitors are characterized by a higher
degree of price stickiness.
To deal with such a spatial autocorrelation that accommodates forms of cross-
retailer interactions, we estimate a spatial-autoregressive (SAR) model where an addi-
tional independent variable (W ∗Sticky) known as a spatial lag is included. This new
variable models contemporaneous interactions between game stations. Each observa-
tion of this spatial-lag variable is a weighted average of the values of the dependent
variable (Sticky) observed for the other cross-sectional gasoline retailers.
The SAR model is defined as follows:
Sticky = ρ W ∗Sticky + γ Comp+ β X + ε (2)
where
Sticky =

Sticky1
...
Stickyn
 ,W =

0 w1,2 . . . w1,n−1 w1,n
w2,1 0 . . . w2,n−1 w2,n
...
...
. . .
...
...
wn−1,1 wn−1,2 . . . 0 wn,n−1
wn,1 w0,2 . . . w0,n−1 0

, Comp =

Comp1
...
Compn
 ,
X =

X1,1 . . . X1,k
...
. . .
...
Xn,1 . . . Xn,k
 , and ε =

ε1
...
εn
 the innovation vector.
W is known as the interaction matrix or contiguity matrix and ρ is the SAR parameter.
The spatial autoregressive parameter measures the intensity of the contemporaneous
interactions in the neighborhood of a gas station. If the ρ coefficient is statistically dif-
ferent from zero, we face evidence of transmission of price stickiness across gas stations.
The distance, expressed in kilometers, between gas stations i and j (wi,j) corresponds
to the Euclidean distance. Equation (2) is estimated using the Maximum Likelihood
(ML) estimator and the min-max method is used to normalise the interaction matrix.
It means that each element wi,j is divided by the minimum of the largest row sum
and column sum of the W matrix8. As previously, we include dummy variables for
8Given the normalization of the spatial-weighting matrix, the parameter space for ρ is the interval
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departments to capture potential unobserved heterogeneity between departments.
Results that we obtain are reported in Table 4. Similarly to Table 3, specification
[1] presents the coefficient estimates with the distance in km to the nearest station
as proxy for local competition (COMP1), while specifications [2], [3] and [4] present
the coefficient estimates when we consider the number of gas stations within a 3km
(COMP2), 5km (COMP3) and 10 km (COMP4) radius as proxies for competition.
We can observe in specifications [1] to [4] that the coefficient of the spatial lag (ρ) is
positive and statistically significant at the conventional levels. This confirms that the
price-setting behavior of gas stations is also driven by the pricing policy of their local
competitors, and then justifies our choice of considering a spatial specification.
More importantly, results of the SAR model confirm those obtained with the OLS
estimator. Indeed, we still find that the estimated coefficient associated with COMP1
is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, while we find the opposite sign
for COMP2, COMP3 and COMP4.
[-1,1].
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Table 4: Local competition and the frequency of price changes: Spatial estimates
[1] [2] [3] [4]
STICKY STICKY STICKY STICKY
SAR parameter (ρ) 0.163** 0.212** 0.185* 0.176*
(0.066) (0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
COMP1 -0.190***
(0.047)
COMP2 0.304***
(0.039)
COMP3 0.180***
(0.021)
COMP4 0.060***
(0.009)
Supermarket -4.376*** -4.215*** -4.232*** -4.365***
(0.331) (0.330) (0.329) (0.329)
Independent retailer -6.327*** -6.293*** -6.264*** -6.286***
(0.663) (0.661) (0.661) (0.662)
Number of services 0.532*** 0.535*** 0.534*** 0.535***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Price level -163.139*** -162.840*** -162.990*** -163.517***
(3.189) (3.179) (3.175) (3.180)
Rural area -1.731*** -2.073*** -2.191*** -2.280***
(0.382) (0.351) (0.349) (0.350)
Medium urban area 2.740*** 2.155*** 2.101*** 2.553***
(0.329) (0.339) (0.338) (0.330)
Major urban area 3.404*** 2.433*** 1.792*** 2.183***
(0.352) (0.377) (0.402) (0.403)
Paris and its region 2.092** 0.787 -0.172 -0.746
(0.989) (1.002) (1.021) (1.078)
Median household income (log) 3.742*** 3.909*** 3.411** 3.127**
(1.375) (1.369) (1.369) (1.377)
Unemployment rate (%) 0.151*** 0.110*** 0.115*** 0.149***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
Number of campings -0.036 -0.030 -0.017 -0.018
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Households owning a car (%) -0.707 -1.844** -2.512*** -3.198***
(0.890) (0.899) (0.910) (0.962)
Number of observations 8.064 8.064 8.064 8.064
Note: This table shows the regression results with the frequency of price changes as dependent
variable. COMP1 refers the distance in km to the nearest gas station, COMP2, COMP3 and COMP4
refer to the number of stations within a 2 km, a 5 km, and a 10 km radius, respectively. The interaction
matrix is different in each specification since the neighborhood of a gas station varies according to the
definition of the local competition. Standard errors are reported below their coefficient estimates.
Constant and dummy variables for departments are included but are not reported.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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5 Conclusion
The academic literature provides manifold explanations for sticky prices9. Among
them, we find for instance the cost-based pricing, the contractual arrangements be-
tween the firms and their customers, the menu and informational costs, the attractive
pricing strategies, the buyers’ habit of judging quality by price, and the lack of compe-
tition. Indeed, it is often argued that pricing policies of firms facing less competition
are more rigid than firms operating in competitive markets. This paper uses the French
retail gasoline market as a study framework to explore this issue.
Using individual gasoline prices collected at a daily frequency for more than 8,000
French gas stations from May 2nd, 2012 to April 30th, 2013, we empirically anal-
yse whether the degree of local competition impacts the price-setting behavior of gas
stations, and is negatively linked to the degree of price stickiness. In other words,
whether a greater competition between gas stations induces a higher flexibility of fuel
retail prices. To this end, we consider the frequency of price changes as an inverse
measure of price stickiness. The degree of local competition is measured using the geo-
coordinates of each station and consists of the distance in km to the nearest station,
and of the number of gas stations within a 3km, 5km and 10 km radius.
Results that we obtain show that the frequency of price changes is positively and
significantly related to the degree of local competition. Our findings confirm therefore
that the intensity of competition on the retail gasoline market is an important driver of
the price-setting behavior of firms, who can make the choice to more or less respond to
wholesale price changes according to the degree of local competition they face and the
characteristics of the local market. Moreover, we show that the relationship between
competition and the rigidity of gasoline pump prices also plays through the pricing
policy of local competitors. Indeed, our spatial estimates indicate that the degree of
price stickiness of neighboring service stations significantly impacts the pricing policy
of gas stations and plays a key role in price rigidity patterns.
Our findings have important implications in terms of competition policy. As for
many other markets, they suggest that enhancing competition between firms is an
effective way for improving consumer welfare. Over the last decade, in a number of
industrialized countries, several measures have been taken by competition agencies for
promoting more competition on road fuel markets and avoiding tacit collusion between
gasoline retailers. However, as recognised by the OECD (2013), identifying price-fixing
arrangements and proving the existence of unlawful anti-competitive behavior is not
always easy for competition authorities. Indeed, the fact that gas stations operating in
a same geographical area adopt a similar price-setting behavior can be simply the result
of a rational and spontaneous independent response of each firm to the expected pricing
9See Fabiani et al. (2005) for a review of theories devoted to the question of price stickiness.
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policy of its competitors (see, e.g., Bishop and Walker, 2002). In response to these
difficulties, some competition agencies have recently made the choice to increase price
transparency on the fuel retail market by providing for instance price sharing services
to motorists. The objective is to reduce consumer search costs when comparing prices
between different gas stations, and then increase competition between fuel retailers.
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Nb. obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
STICKY 8064 21.44 12.66 0.59 100
COMP1 8064 2.10 2.81 0 24.18
COMP2 8064 3.69 4.58 0 32
COMP3 8064 7.67 10.74 0 68
COMP4 8064 21.59 35.98 0 216
Supermarket 8064 0.48 0.49 0 1
Independent retailer 8064 0.03 0.16 0 1
Number of services 8064 6.27 3.78 1 24
Price level 8064 1.40 0.05 1.26 1.81
Rural area 8064 0.16 0.36 0 1
Medium urban area 8064 0.18 0.38 0 1
Major urban area 8064 0.22 0.41 0 1
Paris and its region 8064 0.08 0.27 0 1
Median household income (log) 8064 9.87 0.14 9.36 10.67
Unemployment rate (%) 8064 13.31 4.79 0.69 38.27
Number of campings 8064 0.89 2.52 0 53
Households owning a car (%) 8064 47.14 2.02 34.1 51.4
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